Abstract-With increasingly favorable economics and bundling of different grid services, energy storage systems (ESSs) are expected to play a key role in integrating renewable generation. This paper considers the coordination of ESS owned by customers located at different buses of a distribution grid. Customers participate in frequency regulation and experience energy prices that increase with the total demand. Charging decisions are coupled across time due to battery dynamics, as well as across network nodes due to competitive pricing and voltage regulation constraints. Maximizing the per-user economic benefit while maintaining voltage magnitudes within allowable limits is posed here as a network-constrained game. It is analytically shown that a generalized Nash equilibrium exists and can be expressed as the minimizer of a convex yet infinite-time horizon aggregate optimization problem. To obtain a practical solution, a Lyapunov optimization approach is adopted to design a real-time scheme offering feasible charging decisions with performance guarantees. The proposed method improves over the standard Lyapunov technique via a novel weighting of user costs. By judiciously exploiting the physical grid response, a distributed implementation of the real-time solver is also designed. The features of the novel algorithmic designs are validated using numerical tests on realistic datasets.
I. INTRODUCTION

E
NERGY storage systems (ESS) are expected to lie at the heart of the smart grid, due to their ability to integrate renewables and balance energy [1] . Indeed, utility-scale programs for distributed resources and demand response motivate individual customers to employ ESS (including electric vehicle (EV) batteries) for arbitrage, peak shaving, and/or frequency regulation. There is hence a compelling need for ESS control policies to maximize economic benefits while ensuring grid stability.
Optimal ESS charging schemes can be broadly classified into offline and online. Offline schemes make decisions beforehand by utilizing information about future quantities in the form of exact values and probabilistic or interval characterizations. An offline worst-case ESS coordination scheme is developed in [2] . Offline protocols for charging EVs under network constraints over a finite horizon are studied in [3] . Model predictive control has been also advocated for optimal ESS charging [4] , [5] . A stochastic dynamic programming formulation for optimal ESS sizing and control is suggested in [6] , while Löhndorf and Minner [7] adopts approximate dynamic programming to jointly store renewable energy and place day-ahead market bids. The underlying assumption about availability of future information renders offline approaches ill-suited for ESS applications with high uncertainty, whereas dynamic programming solutions are impractical for multiple networked ESS.
Several real-time ESS coordination methods rely on Lyapunov optimization, originally developed for handling data network queues [8] . This technique was first adopted for real-time energy arbitrage in data centers in [9] . Aiming at minimizing the average electricity cost over an infinite time horizon, the derived online scheme yields feasible charging decisions with provable suboptimality guarantees. The technique has been extended to cope with battery charging inefficiencies [10] ; towards distributed ESS implementations involving an aggregator [11] ; and for handling the exit/return dynamics of EVs [12] . The Lyapunov approach has also been employed for microgrid energy management under network constraints in [13] . However, the feasibility of the charging decisions was only numerically demonstrated. A Lyapunov method for coordinating ESS operating at two timescales is devised in [14] . The Lyapunov technique has been also geared towards managing energy storage over a finite time horizon [15] . The technique has been interpreted as a stochastic dual approximation algorithm; see [16] for an application to jointly optimize energy storage and load shedding. Built on competitive analysis, finite time-horizon algorithms have been suggested for arbitrage using energy storage [17] , and for peak-shaving during electric vehicle charging [18] .
The previous approaches presume non-competitive setups. Nevertheless, ESS are usually owned by separate entities and charging decisions are mutually coupled due to competitive pricing or physical network constraints, thus leading naturally to game theoretic formulations. Reference [19] solves an offline Stackelberg game for ESS charging under behavioral constraints. The competitive scenario in which multiple users aim to minimize their day-ahead cost of operating distributed generation and storage is analyzed in [20] . Sharing ESS resources among users has been shown to be beneficial for arbitrage gains [21] . Sharing storage and renewable resources have been further studied as coalition games in [22] . This work considers the competitive scenario of optimally coordinating user-owned ESS sited at different buses of a distribution grid. The first contribution is to combine Lyapunov optimization with a game-theoretic setup for solving an infinite-horizon energy storage problem. As described in Section II, charging decisions are coupled through voltage constraints and a competitive pricing mechanism incorporating energy charges and frequency regulation benefits. Section III formulates the ESS coordination task as a voltage-constrained game. For this game, we show the existence of a generalized Nash equilibrium that can be found as the minimizer of an aggregate yet infinite-horizon convex quadratic problem. Our second contribution is a weighted Lyapunov method to obtain a real-time, near-optimal solver for the aggregate problem (Section IV). Section V quantifies the solver's performance gain over the non-weighted formulation of [15] . It is additionally proved that, even under voltage constraints, one can bound the suboptimality and guarantee feasibility of the obtained charging decisions. As a third contribution and to protect customer's privacy, Section VI computes the charging decisions at each control period in a decentralized fashion leveraging dual decomposition and the physical system response. The scheme is numerically tested in Section VII, and Section VIII concludes the work.
Regarding notation, lower-(upper-) case boldface letters denote column vectors (matrices). Calligraphic symbols are reserved for sets. Vectors 0 and 1 are the all-zero and allone vectors. Symbol x 2 denotes the 2 -norm of x and transposition. The main symbols are explained in Table I. II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION Consider a power distribution system serving N electricity users indexed by n. The system operation is discretized into periods indexed by t. Let t n and q t n denote respectively the active and reactive load for user n during period t. For a compact representation, the loads at period t are collected into the N-dimensional vectors t and q t . User loads are assumed inelastic and bounded within known intervals as
Each user owns an energy storage unit also indexed by n. The state of charge (SoC) for unit n at the beginning of slot t is denoted by s t n . The energy by which unit n is charged over period t is denoted by b t n , and it is positive (negative) during (dis)-charging. For simplicity, it is assumed that energy storage units are ideal (unit efficiency). Moreover, since distribution grid customers are currently charged only for active power, energy storage units are assumed to be operated at unit power factor. Upon stacking {b t n , s t n } N n=1 in vectors (b t , s t ) accordingly, the battery dynamics are described as 
where vector
The underlying distribution grid is modeled as a radial single-phase system represented by the graph G = ({0, N }, E). The substation is indexed by 0 and the remaining buses comprise the set N := {1, . . . , N}. Each bus hosts one energy storage unit. The edge set E models distribution lines. If π n is the parent bus of bus n, the grid is modeled by the branch flow equations [23] 
where r π n ,n + jx π n ,n is the impedance of line (π n , n) ∈ E; {I t π n ,n , P t π n ,n , Q t π n ,n } is the complex current and the (re)active power flowing from bus π n to bus n at time t; V t n is the voltage phasor at bus n; and C n is the set of children buses for n. Equations (4a)-(4b) stem from conservation of power, while (4c) captures the drop in squared voltage magnitudes along line (π n , n) [23] .
To avoid the nonlinearity in (4c), distribution grids are oftentimes studied using the linear distribution flow (LDF) model introduced in [23] . The latter originates upon setting I t π n ,n = 0 for all n in (4). Alternatively, it can be derived using a first-order Taylor series approximation of power injections as functions of voltages evaluated at the flat voltage profile V t n = 1 + j0 for all n [24] . The connectivity of a grid with N buses and L distribution lines is captured by the branch-bus incidence matrixÃ ∈ {0, ±1} L×(N+1) . MatrixÃ can be partitioned asÃ = [a 0 A]. For a radial grid with L = N, matrix A is square and invertible. By dropping the last summands in the RHS of (4), the LDF model can be compactly expressed as [25] 
where
; the symbol dg indicates a diagonal matrix; and v 0 = |V t 0 | 2 is the squared voltage magnitude at the substation that is maintained constant.
Eliminating (P t , Q t ) from (5) and exploiting the fact that a 0 + A1 = 0 or A −1 a 0 = −1, the vector v t can be approximated as [24] , [26] 
where 1 is the all-one vector and
Numerical tests report that the approximation errors in voltage magnitudes introduced by the LDF model of (6) are less than 0.005 pu; see for example [25, Fig. 6 ], [27] . Because the entries of (R, X) are non-negative for overhead lines [25] , the model in (6) implies that voltage magnitudes decrease with increasing (p t , q t ). Grid standards confine nodal voltages to be close to v 0 [28] . For example, nodal voltages |V t n | should be within 0.97 and 1.03 pu, implying that v t n = |V t n | 2 ∈ [0.97 2 , 1.03 2 ] for all n ∈ N . The latter introduces linear inequality constraints on power demands as
where α := 0.97 2 − v 0,pu and β := 1.03 2 − v 0,pu . The voltage regulation constraints of (7) couple charging decisions spatially across costumers. Additional network constraints, such as apparent power limits for lines and (substation) transformers could be included. It is henceforth assumed these limits have been taken care of while allocating loads and sizing transformers, or when the utility grants permission to energy storage installations. For this reason, the next formulations focus on voltage regulation constraints. Nevertheless, if flow limits have to enforced in real time as well, the modification described later in Remark 3 can be adopted. The cost of electricity is varying across time and consists of two components: (i) an energy charge related to real-time energy prices; and (ii) a balancing charge compensating users for participating in frequency regulation. In detail, the cost of electricity for user n at time t is
where b t −n denotes a vector containing the charging decisions for all but the n-th user.
The first summand in the right-hand side (RHS) of (8) constitutes the energy charge for user n. Different from [11] , the per-unit price is an affine function of the total demand and is assumed to be positive for all t: it includes the base charge c t 0 plus the competitive term c t
, the per-unit price increases with increasing net total demand and users are motivated to reduce consumption and/or inject energy. When N i=1 p t i < 0, the per-unit price decreases with increasing energy surplus, thus signaling users to consume. The demand in the feeder may be partially supplied by the transmission grid through the substation.
Remark 1: The affine dependence of the electricity price
p t i on the total demand reflects the fact that the utility participates in a bulk electricity market: higher demand translates to increasingly higher costs. The regulated scenario where customers are subjected to fixed pricing can be captured by setting c t p = 0. Although piecewise-linear pricing could be accommodated, the exposition is restricted to affine pricing to avoid mathematical clutter.
The second summand in the RHS of (8) is the balancing charge defined as the product between the regulation signal r t ; the regulation price c t r ; and the battery charge b t n . The regulation signal is issued by the operator: r t = +1 when there is energy surplus and storage units can only be charged, and r t = −1 during energy deficit periods when storage units can only be discharged. Hence, for all n and t
Due to (9), the regulation benefit r t c t r b t n = c t r |b t n | is always positive, and it can thus reduce the total cost for user n in (8) . Here, prices can vary in an arbitrary manner, they are bounded
The setup where (dis)-charging decisions do not have to comply with r t as in (9) is treated in Remark 4.
III. A GAME-THEORETIC PERSPECTIVE
Due to the coupling between the users' decisions, minimizing the electricity costs for all users constitutes a voltageconstrained non-cooperative game [29] . Each user n seeks to minimize its time-averaged expected electricity cost
where E is the expectation over the involved random variables
. Then, user n would like to solve the infinite-horizon problem
Since the instantaneous costs f t n in (8) depend on the total demand, the average costs {F n } N n=1 depend on the decisions of all users. The optimal charging decisions are further coupled through the voltage regulation constraints in (7), thus rendering (11) a generalized Nash game [30] . Formally, we define the game in its strategic form with its set of users N ; their costs {F n } N n=1 ; and the space of feasible (satisfying (7)) strategies B. The feasible strategies for user n can now be defined as B n ({b t −n }) := {{b t n } : {b t n , b t −n } ∈ B}. A sequence of charging decisions {b t } constitutes a generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) if it solves simultaneously the N coupled minimizations in (11) . Hence, a GNE is a feasible strategy minimizing the per-user cost as long as the remaining users maintain their strategies, that is for all n,
A GNE may not necessarily exist. Even if it does, finding it is not always computationally tractable [30] . To prove that a GNE exists for the proposed game and devise algorithms for finding a GNE, we will next transform the set of peruser minimizations in (11) into a single minimization. The minimizer of this aggregate problem is a GNE for (11) .
To this end, we first introduce two auxiliary functions. The first function is the aggregate cost at time t
The function f t (b t ) is not the sum of the per-user costs
, but has been constructed so that for all n
Using (13) in the second-order Taylor series expansion of the quadratic functions f t (b t ) and f t n (b t ) yields the key property
The second function is the time-averaged aggregate cost
Again, the function F({b t }) is not the sum of {F n ({b t })} N n=1 ; but it satisfies
for all n. The property in (16) follows easily from (14) . In essence F({b t }) is the exact potential function for (11) , which casts the game as a generalized potential game [31] . Consider next the convex minimization problem φ := min (2), (3), (7), (9) . (17) Problem (17) relates to the original problem in (11) as follows. Proposition 1: The minimizer {b t } of (17) is a GNE for (11) .
Proof: Because f t (b t ) is quadratic in terms of b t with a strictly positive definite Hessian matrix c t p 2 I + 11 , it is strictly convex. Strict convexity carries over to F({b t }). Since the constraints are linear, the optimization in (17) enjoys a unique minimizer {b t } satisfying
for allb t n ∈ B n ({b t −n }) withb t n =b t n and n ∈ N . Using (16) 
thus proving that {b t } is a GNE [see (12) ]. Remark 2: Consider the special case in which each cost f t n depends only on b t n ; e.g., c t p = 0 in (8) . Then, the exact potential function for (11) can be formulated as the sum of the per-user costs, i.e., F({b t }) = N n=1 F n ({b t n }). In this case, a minimizer of (17) is not only a GNE for (11) , but also its social-welfare solution.
Proposition 1 asserts that identifying a GNE amounts to solving (17) . Since users lack information on the distribution network, problem (17) can be solved centrally by an aggregator. Albeit convex, the minimization in (17) is challenging: Decisions are coupled over the infinite time horizon via (2a)-(2b), and across grid buses via (7) . Further, coping with the expected electricity cost requires knowing the joint probability density function of {r t , c t 0 , c t p , c t r , t , q t }. Similar problems are oftentimes tackled through approximate dynamic programming schemes, which are computationally intense [32] . Leveraging Lyapunov-based optimization and dual decomposition, a near-optimal real-time solver is put forth next.
IV. A REAL-TIME SOLVER
To devise a real-time solver for (17) , consider the problem φ := min
s.to (2c), (3), (7), (9) (20b)
Problem (20) is derived from (17) by replacing (2a)-(2b) by the constraint (20c) on the expected time-averaged battery charging. In fact, every charging sequence {b t } complying with (2a)-(2b) satisfies also (20c); see [9] , [10] , or [16] for a proof. Hence, the minimization in (20) is a relaxation of the optimization problem in (17) . We next adopt the Lyapunov-based techniques of [8] to devise a real-time approximate solver for the relaxed problem in (20) . This solver outputs charging decisions {b t } attaining the objective valueφ := F({b t }). In Section V, we will show thatφ is -suboptimal for the relaxed problem in (20) and that {b t } is feasible not only for (20) , but also for (17) . This implies thatφ
In other words, the approximate solver of (20) achieves bounded suboptimality for (17) . The bounds in (21) refer to F({b t }) and not to F n ({b t })'s. We will show that the sequence {b t } lies within bounded average distance from {b t }, which is the minimizer of (17) and the GNEP for (11) .
To proceed with establishing the previous claims, Lyapunov optimization introduces virtual queues and then stabilizes them to satisfy the average constraint in (20c) [8] . For each user n, introduce a parameter γ n and define the virtual queue as
Define also the weighted Lyapunov function as
where {w n } N n=1 are positive weights we introduce to handle the heterogeneous capacities and charging rates across energy storage units. Parameters {γ n , w n } are stacked in vectors γ and w. Next, we derive upper bounds on the expected differences of successive L t 's given the values of virtual queues collected in vector x t . These upper bounds will help us later quantify the performance of real-time solvers.
Lemma 1:
Proof: Being a shifted version of s t n , the queue x t n evolves similarly to (2a) as x t+1 n = x t n + b t n . By substituting these queue dynamics in the definition of t , we get
The bound in (24) (7), (9) . (25) Although the average constraint (20c) does not appear in (25) , it is implicitly enforced upon convergence [8] . It is worth stressing that (25) , w) , and does not enforce the SoC constraints of (2b). By properly designing (γ , w), the next section optimizes the performance of the real-time solver and guarantees that SoCs remain within limits. Remark 3: Power flows may be restricted by transformer ratings and line thermal limits. These constraints can be readily included in the all the preceding minimizations, that is (11), (17) , (20) , and (25) . In this case, the charging decisions obtained from (25) may not yield realizable SoCs. This issue can be easily resolved if together with the line flow constraints, the SoC constraints s n ≤ s t n + b t n ≤ s n are added to (25); note that s t n is known at time t. By doing so, the updated s t+1 n 's remain within limits. Although this simple adaptation of (25) yields implementable charging decisions, its performance is not necessarily characterized by the analysis of Section V.
Remark 4: An argument similar to Remark 3 holds for constraint (9) . If the energy storage units do not have to comply with the (dis)-charging signal r t , problem (25) can be solved upon dropping (9) and appending the SoC constraints s n ≤ s t n + b t n ≤ s n . In this case, if r t = +1 andb t n < 0 at time t, user n experiences the regulation penalty of r t c t rb t n , and the suboptimality bound of Section V may not hold.
V. ANALYSIS OF THE REAL-TIME SOLVER
Next, we show that the charging decisions obtained by the real-time solver of (25) are: (i) feasible for the non-relaxed aggregate problem in (17) ; and (ii) within bounded distance both in terms of the optimal cost for (17) and the GNE decisions of (11) . The analysis extends the results of [9] to the networked ESS setup and relies on two assumptions:
(a1) For energy storage unit n ∈ N , its capacity and charge limits satisfy s n − s n > b n − b n .
(a2) In absence of energy storage, the (re)active loads ( t , q t ) can be served without violating the voltage regulation limits, that is α1 ≤ −R t − Xq t ≤ β1. Assumption (a1) essentially excludes fast-charging energy storage units and is commonly adopted in energy storage coordination [10] , [11] , [16] . If s n = 0 and b n = −b n , this assumption implies that 2b n < s n , or that it takes more than two periods for an empty battery to be fully charged. This is reasonable if one considers a Tesla supercharger, which can fully charge an EV battery within an hour, participating in a real-time energy market with a control period of 5 or 10 minutes as tested in Section VII.
Assumption (a2) complies with the assumption that energy storage units do not serve voltage regulation purposes.
Excluding energy storage, nodal voltages can be maintained within limits through inverters in solar panels or conventional voltage regulation equipment (regulators, capacitor banks). Although energy storage units do not participate in voltage regulation, they do not incur voltage deviations since the problem in (25) enforces (7) among its constraints. Albeit useful analytically, Section VII includes tests where (a2) is not met.
The SoCsŝ t+1 =ŝ t +b t corresponding to the decisions {b t } obtained from (25) are not explicitly constrained within [s, s]. This property makes it possible to solve (25) in real time. By properly designing the parameters (γ , w) , the minimizers of (25) will be shown to be feasible for (17) . The next property is the key ingredient to that end and is shown in the Appendix.
Theorem 1: Under (a2), the minimizerb t of (25) Theorem 2: Under (a1), the minimizerb t of (25) is also feasible for (17) when (γ , w) satisfy
Theorem 2, which is proved in the Appendix, asserts that although the complicating time-coupling constraintŝ t ∈ [s, s] has been dropped from (25) , it is actually satisfied by proper parameter tuning. Then, the real-time decisionsb t are feasible for the offline aggregate problem in (17) . Being the minimizer of (25) , the sequenceb t is not necessarily the minimizer of (17) . Nonetheless, it is shown next that {b t } features bounded suboptimality. The ensuing lemma will be needed.
Lemma 2 [8] : If {r t , c t 0 , c t p , c t r , t , q t } are independent and identically distributed (iid) over time, there exists a stationary policy, i.e., a policy selectingb t based only on the current realizations of the involved random variables. This policy further satisfies (2c), (3), (9), (7)
Using Lemma 2, it is shown in the Appendix that the average aggregate cost attained by the real-time decisionŝ φ := F({b t }) satisfies the ensuing suboptimality claim. (27) where
n }. Due to the quadratic cost, the suboptimality bound in terms of the cost is translated to a suboptimality bound on charging decisions as proved in the Appendix.
Theorem 4: Let {b t } be the minimizer of (25) , and {b t } the minimizer of (17) that is also the sought GNE. Then,
Theorem 4 guarantees that the obtained charging decisions lie close to the GNE decisions, thus providing a sense of satisfaction among users. Based on the suboptimality bounds provided by Theorems 3 and 4, the performance of the real-time solver can be optimized by minimizing the quantity K over the weights w subject to w n δ n ≥ 1 for all n ∈ N [see (26a)]. Since K is separable over {w n }, the optimal weights are simply w n := δ −1 n . Moreover, by plugging {w n } into (26b), it is not hard to verify that its leftmost and rightmost sides coincide. Then, the allowable range for each γ n collapses to a single value.
Corollary 1: To minimize the suboptimality bound and guarantee feasibility of the SoC variables, the parameters {γ , w} in (25) should be selected for all n ∈ N as
The suboptimality bound becomes
Corollary 1 sets the values for parameters {γ , w} in (25). Since s n −b n > s n −b n by assumption (a1), it follows that γ n > s n − b n ≥ 0. Corollary 1 further justifies having user-specific weights {w n } in (25): The standard non-weighted Lyapunov technique of [9] would have resulted in a common weight for all n w nw = δ −1 min (29) where δ min := min δ n . 1 The weight w nw guarantees there exist {γ n } satisfying (26b) and attaining suboptimality gap
Rather than having the user with the smallest δ n controlling the algorithm performance, the weights in (25) account for heterogeneity across energy storage units.
VI. DISTRIBUTED IMPLEMENTATION
The minimization in (25) can be performed in a centralized fashion using standard (e.g., interior point-based) or customized solvers for linearly-constrained convex quadratic programs. In that case however, the limits (s, s, b, b) along with the sequences { t , q t , s t } need to be communicated from the users to the aggregator. To waive possible concerns on user privacy, a distributed scheme for tackling (25) is proposed next. To simplify notation, the superscript t will be dropped.
Let us first rewrite (25) in the equivalent form
where c n := w n x n − rc r + c 0 . Note that variable p = b + has been eliminated; the constraint (31b) combines (2c) and (9); the new variable a captures the net active power demand through (31c); and (31d) enforces voltage regulation.
To derive a decentralized solver, we adopt dual decomposition and introduce Lagrange multipliers ν and λ ≥ 0 (λ ≥ 0) for constraint (31c) and the left-hand (right-hand) side of (31d), respectively. Dual decomposition updates these Lagrange multipliers through the projected gradient ascent iterations [33, Ch. 6] 
where η j ν , η j λ > 0 are step sizes; the maximum operator is applied entrywise; and (a j , b j ) are the minimizers of the Lagrangian function associated with the minimization in (31) evaluated at (ν j , λ j , λ j ). The primal variable a j can be found by the aggregator in closed-form as
Then, the charging decisions at iteration j can be updated separately over users by solving
The minimizer of (34) can be readily found in closed form as
where the [x] b a := max{min{x, b}, a} projects x onto the interval [a, b] . Given the strict convexity of the objective in (25) , the iterations in (32)- (35) are guaranteed to converge to the optimal dual and primal variables [33] . The steps involved for solving (25) at time t are tabulated as Algorithm 1.
To update the dual variables in (32), the aggregator needs to know R t + Xq t and 1 t . Given (6), the former can be calculated indirectly as R t +Xq t = v t −v 0 1−Rb t−1 assuming the previous charging decisionsb t−1 persist at the beginning of period t and that the aggregator measures v t . Calculating 1 t can also be performed without sending private information to the aggregator. Instead, the total load 1 t can be computed by having nodes communicating over a spanning tree rooted at the aggregator. Leaf nodes pass their load values to their parents, their parents sum up the received information and their own load, and the recursion proceeds. The communication tree does not necessarily match the electric grid and can be randomized at each time.
Due to the way optimal weights w n 's are determined in Remark 1, the users do not need to communicate their δ n Algorithm 1 Distributed Solver for (25) Aggregator communicates to users the entries of λ t,j := R(λ t,j − λ t,j ) − ν t,j 1.
7:
User n updates b t,j n via (35) and communicates it back to the aggregator.
8:
Net load 1 is communicated to the aggregator. 9: Aggregator updates primal variable a t,j from (33). 10: Aggregator updates multipliers (ν t,j , λ t,j , λ t,j ) by (32).
11: end for or w n to the aggregator. This is an added advantage of our weighted Lyapunov optimization method over the conventional one where δ n 's have to be shared to identify δ min .
VII. NUMERICAL TESTS
To recapitulate, each user would ideally like to reach the generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) obtained by solving (11) . Given its stochastic and infinite-time horizon nature, solving (11), or even obtaining its optimal valueφ is computationally intractable. Theorem 4 though ensured that the decisions obtained by (25) lie close to the GNE with the distance being proportional to the suboptimality gap (φ −φ). This section evaluates different real-time charging schemes based on the objective value φ := F({b t }) they attain. This is because if a sequence {b t } yields smaller φ, this sequence lies closer to the sought GNE {b t }, which is impossible to compute.
The developed charging schemes were evaluated using load data from the Pecan Street project comprising both consumption and solar generation [34] . Lacking reactive injections, a lagging power factor of 0.9 was assumed. Five minute averages were obtained from the minute-based load data. The so obtained load data were placed on the IEEE 13-bus and 34-bus feeders along with energy storage units. Both feeders were converted to single-phase grids as described in [35] . Voltage deviations were allowed to lie within ±1% by setting α = −0.0199 and β = 0.020 in (7) .
The developed Lyapunov-based algorithm was compared against two competing alternatives. The first alternative is a standard Lyapunov-based algorithm. Both the developed and the standard (non-weighted) Lyapunov schemes were operated for the parameter values minimizing the related suboptimality gaps [see (28) and (29)]. The second alternative is the greedy charging scheme
which can be implemented in real time similar to (25) . Different from (25) though, the problem in (36) involves only the instantaneous cost f t , and it explicitly enforces the SoC constraints (2a)-(2b). Since by using {γ , w }, the minimizer of (25) also satisfies (2a)-(2b), the only difference between (25) and (36) In other words, the greedy scheme selects the currently optimal decision, whereas (25) takes into account the current price along with the current SoC. For example, the scheme of (25) requires higher financial benefit to decide to charge an almost full battery.
To showcase the superiority of the Lyapunov scheme over the greedy approach, we first tested the costs attained for the synthetically generated pricing and regulation signals shown in Fig. 2 . According to this setup named Scenario 1, the values for r t were oscillating between {±1} every 15 slots, and the prices {Nc t p , c t 0 , c t r } were oscillating between {5, 20} $/unit with the former lasting for 10 slots and the latter for 5. Homes from the Pecan Street project with data identifiers 93, 171, 187, 252, 370, 545, 555, 585, 624, 744, 861, and 890 were placed on the buses of the IEEE 13-bus feeder of Fig. 1 . Further, we set b n = −b n and s n = 0 for all n. The average aggregate costs attained are depicted in Figure 3 , where the weighted Lyapunov-based scheme clearly outperforms the greedy one. This is because the greedy scheme (dis)-charges the energy storage units myopically to their capacities during the low price of $5/unit, rather than waiting to reap maximum rewards at $20/unit. The Lyapunov scheme on the other hand saves some storage capacity for later opportunities.
To simulate a more realistic setup termed Scenario 2 was tested. Under Scenario 2, the price c t 0 was set to the hourly real-time locational marginal prices for the RTO hub in the PJM market for 2011. Hourly prices were repeated 12 times to yield 5-minute prices. The coefficient c t p was selected as c t p = c t 0 N . Similarly, the price c t r was set to the PJM regulation market clearing price for the same year, while the regulation signal r t was modeled as a zero-mean {±1} Bernoulli random variable capturing the nature of actual frequency regulation signals. The (dis)-charging rates were decreased by a factor of 16 compared to Scenario 1.
To demonstrate the convergence of Algorithm 1, Figure 4 shows the primal and dual variables corresponding to bus 5. During this period, the under-voltage constraint of (7) was active, thus yielding λ 5 > 0. Using the diminishing step-size sequences η j ν = 3·10 6 /(j+1) and η j ν = 2/(j+1), convergence was achieved within 30 iterations. Figure 5 shows the time-averaged cost of (17) obtained by the different schemes. The results indicate that the developed real-time solver outperforms both alternatives. Its superiority over (36) is attributed to the myopic nature of the greedy scheme as discussed earlier. The improvement of our scheme over the standard Lyapunov approach is explained by the enhanced suboptimality gap of (30) . The larger suboptimality gap of the non-weighted scheme has been explained in the paragraph after Remark 1. Scenario 2 was also tested under the setup of Remark 4, where charging decisions do not have to align with the regulation signal r t . Even after this modification, approximately 85% of the charging decisions still aligned with (9) , and the SOCs always respected (2a). The developed real-time solver still outperformed its alternatives as validated in Fig. 6 .
Finally, to study its scalability, the proposed scheme was tested on the IEEE 34-bus feeder shown in Fig. 7 . For this setup named Scenario 3, load data from the Pecan Street project were mapped to the feeder buses according to Table II. The energy storage parameters were set as b n = s n /100, b n = −b n , and s n = 0 for all n. Tests were carried out using MATLAB R2016a on a 64-bit Windows 10 PC powered by a 2.6 GHz Intel i7-6700HQ CPU and 12 GB DDR3 RAM. The attained averaged costs are shown in Fig. 8 . The distributed implementation of Section VI was timed against solving (25) using YALMIP and the SeDuMi solver [36] , [37] . The off-theshelf solver ran for 430 sec, while the distributed algorithm needed only 10 sec. 
VIII. CONCLUSION
A novel approach combining game theory with Lyapunov optimization has been put forth to analyze competitive energy storage problems. A generalized Nash equilibrium has been shown to exist and can be found through a potential function. Leveraging Lyapunov optimization, a real-time scheme offering feasible charging decisions with suboptimality guarantees has been devised. The suggested decentralized implementation utilizes the distribution grid response and protects user's privacy. Numerical tests using realistic datasets have demonstrated the convergence of the distributed solver and the performance gain of the real-time scheme over its non-weighted counterpart and a greedy alternative. Extending our solvers to exact grid models and demand-response setups; considering multi-phase networks; including thermostatically-controlled loads; and incorporating partial information on future loads and prices form pertinent open research topics. 
